Tingkat Keaktifan Komite Audit dan Manajemen Laba di Indonesia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12695/jmt.2018.17.2.2Keywords:
audit committee, meeting frequency, agency theory, monitoring, company earning management.Abstract
Abstrak. Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh tingkat keaktifan komite audit terhadap manajemen laba di Indonesia. Rerangka konseptual merujuk pada teori keagenan yang menyatakan bahwa tingkat keaktifan merupakan fondasi utama bagi komite audit untuk meningkatkan efektivitas monitoring. Teori ini memprediksi hubungan negatif antara tingkat keaktifan audit komite dengan manajemen laba. Pengujian hipotesis dilakukan dengan menggunakan sampel perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar pada Bursa Efek Indonesia selama periode tahun 2009 sampai 2014. Tingkat keaktifan mengacu pada jumlah rapat dan partisipasi anggota menghadiri rapat sedangkan manajemen laba diukur dengan rujukan pendekatan akrual. Analisa dilakukan dengan menggunakan regresi ordinary least square data panel. Hasil analisa menunjukkan bahwa frekuensi rapat berpengaruh secara insignifikan terhadap tingkat akrual, di lain pihak, tingkat partisipasi rapat berhubungan secara terbalik dengan akrual negatif. Hasil tersebut terbebas dari masalah sensitivitas interdependensi antar mekanisme governance internal. Namun demikian, temuan tersebut mengindikasikan kemungkinan adanya masalah kontijensi terhadap pengukuran dan sifat sampel yang digunakan sebagai basis pengujian.
Kata kunci: Komite audit, frekuensi rapat, teori agensi, monitoring, manajemen laba perusahaan.
Abstract. This study tests the effect of audit committee activeness on earning management in Indonesia. The conceptual framework refers to agency theory which states that the level of activeness is the main foundation for audit committee to improve the effectiveness of monitoring. This theory predicts the negative relationship between audit committee activeness and earning management. The hypotheses are tested on the data collected from sampled manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2009-2014 periods. The level of audit committee activeness refers to the numbers of meetings and participation from audit committee members while earning management is measured by referring to accrual approach. The analysis is performed using ordinary least square regression on panel data. The analysis results show that the frequency of meeting has insignificant effect on accrual level, on the other side, the level of participation in the meeting has reverse relationship with negative accrual. The result is free from interdependence among internal governance mechanisms. However, the finding indicates the probability of contingency problem on the measurement and sample characteristic used as the basis in the analysis.
Keywords: Audit committee, meeting frequency, agency theory, monitoring, company earning management.
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