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Determinan Intensitas Transaksi Afiliasi pada Perusahaan-perusahaan dalam Grup Bisnis di Bursa Efek Indonesia

Martua Eliakim Tambunan, Hermanto Siregar, Adler Haymans Manurung, Dominicus Savio Priyarsono

Abstract


Abstrak. Transaksi afiliasi merupakan aksi korporasi penting dengan tingkat kejadian tertinggi dari seluruh aksi korporasi emiten yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Intensitas transaksi afiliasi memungkinkan ekspropriasi hak pemegang saham minoritas serta berpengaruh terhadap nilai perusahaan. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis determinan-determinan yang mempengaruhi intensitas transaksi afiliasi pada perusahaan dalam grup bisnis di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Determinan tersebut adalah kepemilikan saham ultimat, tata kelola perusahaan yang baik (dengan komisaris independen dan kantor akuntan publik Big Four sebagai proxy), rasio utang terhadap modal serta periode krisis. Penelitian ini menggunakan data panel dengan periode waktu kuartalan dari 2006 sampai 2013. Sampel ditentukan dengan cara purposive sampling yang berfokus kepada tipologi perusahaan yaitu perusahaan yang tergabung dalam tiga grup bisnis mewakili tiga lapisan kapitalisasi pasar. Hasil menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan saham ultimat secara tidak signifikan berpengaruh positif terhadap intensitas transaksi afiliasi. Komisaris independen dan rasio utang terhadap modal secara signifikan berpengaruh positif terhadap intensitas transaksi afiliasi. Kantor akuntan publik Big Four secara signifikan berpengaruh negatif terhadap intensitas transaksi afiliasi. Periode krisis secara tidak signifikan berpengaruh negatif terhadap intensitas transaksi afiliasi. Determinan-determinan tersebut secara keseluruhan berpengaruh terhadap intensitas transaksi afiliasi.

Keywords: transaksi afiliasi, grup bisnis, pemegang saham ultimat, tata kelola perusahaan yang baik, rasio utang terhadap modal.

 

Abstract. Related party transactions are important corporate actions with the highest incidence rate of all issuers’ corporate actions listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Related party transactions' intensity allows minority  holders' expropriation right and affects company's value. This study aimed to analyze the determinants affecting related party transactions’ intensity in companies in the business groups in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The determinants were ultimate shareholders, good corporate governance (with independent commissioner and the Big Four public accounting firms as proxies), debt to equity ratio, and period of crisis. This study used panel data with quarterly time period from 2006 to 2013. Samples were determined by purposive sampling focusing on companies’ typology, namely companies in the three business groups representing the market capitalization’s three layers.  The results showed that ultimate shareholders insignificantly had positive effect on related party transactions’ intensity. Independent commisioners and debt to equity ratio significantly had positive effect on related party transactions’ intensity. The Big Four public accounting firms significantly had negative effect on related party transactions’ intensity. Period of crisis insignificantly had negative effect on related party transactions’ intensity. The determinants as a whole have an effect on the intensity of related party transactions.

Keywords: related party transaction, business group, ultimate shareholder, good corporate governance, debt to equity ratio.


Keywords


related party transaction, business group, ultimate shareholder, good corporate governance, debt to equity ratio.

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12695/jmt.2016.15.2.2

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